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Abstract 
Online social networks like Facebook and LinkedIn regularly use People You May Know (PYMK) 
algorithms to encourage connectivity among their users. We argue that these algorithms have the 
unintended effect of making users’ interactions more visible, which can deter them from being intimate 
online. To test this theory, we analyze data from a large online social network that lets users buy and 
exchange electronic greeting cards (eCards) with each other over the network. We find that users are 
more likely to buy eCards when they have more connections, but less likely to buy them when they have 
formed connections to friends of friends. We attribute the latter effect to the increased visibility that comes 
with connecting to friends of friends, which PYMK algorithms encourage. We find no effect of users’ 
friends connecting to each other, suggesting that the PYMK effect has to do with promoting surveillance 
by relative strangers rather than with increasing network density more broadly. 
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1 Introduction1 
Increasingly, algorithms shape what we see and do online. Google uses an algorithm to rank its 
search results (Brin and Page 1998), Facebook uses an algorithm to decide what to display in the News 
Feed (Eslami et al. 2015), and e-commerce sites use algorithms to determine what prices to charge 
(Hannak et al. 2014). While these algorithms are usually invisible to outsiders (Pasquale 2015), they are 
often designed to optimize certain metrics – like time spent on site, click rates, or purchase incidence. 
Recent advances in machine learning and collaborative filtering have greatly improved how well these 
algorithms optimize pre-specified metrics, but we know relatively little about what some of their 
unintended consequences might be. These unintended consequences are likely unknown even to 
algorithm designers themselves, and so may affect a company’s bottom line in unexpected ways. 
The focus of this paper is on a set of algorithms readily deployed by online social networks, like 
LinkedIn and Facebook, to encourage connectivity among their users. Commonly referred to as People 
You May Know (PYMK) algorithms, they generate a list of people with whom users might be interested in 
connecting. This list is then displayed on the platform’s site in the hopes that it nudges users to form new 
connections on the network. Guy et al. (2009) point out that recommendations generated by PYMK 
algorithms are mainly people with whom users share mutual connections – otherwise known as friends of 
friends. This is likely because the metric that platforms optimize in this case is the rate that 
recommendations convert to connection requests, and people are more inclined to request a connection 
from those that know their other friends. 
What could be some unintended consequences of PYMK algorithms? For one, increasing the size of 
users’ networks makes their actions visible to more people. This can heighten privacy concerns and 
discourage users from sharing information on the platform (Brandtzæg et al. 2010, Raynes-Goldie 2010). 
We argue that, in addition to making users’ actions more visible, PYMK algorithms also tend to make their 
interactions more visible. To understand why, we must keep in mind that PYMK algorithms encourage 
connections to friends of friends. Moreover, social media platforms readily show users interactions, or 
correspondences, that occur between two of their friends. Put together, this suggests that PYMK 
algorithms make interactions between users more visible (see Figure 1). 
Increased visibility can discourage people from being intimate online (Gross and Acquisti 2005). 
Intimacy requires private disclosures of information (Gerstein 1984), which can be difficult to achieve in 
settings where interactions are largely public. We thus expect that PYMK algorithms have the unintended 
effect of deterring intimacy between users, for fear that their correspondences are being watched. We test 
this hypothesis in the context of a large online social network that lets users buy and exchange electronic  
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Figure 1. Illustration of how PYMK algorithms increase visibility of interactions 
 
greeting cards (eCards) with one another. We find that users are more likely to buy eCards when they 
have more connections, but less likely to buy them if they have connected to friends of friends. We use 
the timing of connection to distinguish the effect of connecting to friends of friends from that of existing 
friends connecting to each other, and only find evidence for the former. Our study has implications for the 
success of digital gifting services, and for how intimacy plays out online more broadly. It also calls for a 
deeper investigation into the unintended consequences of algorithms, both to the companies that design 
them and to society more broadly. 
 
2 Theoretical Development 
The question of how people behave when under surveillance, whether social (like users’ friends on 
Facebook) or institutional (like Facebook the company or the NSA) is garnering considerable scholarly 
attention. Raynes-Goldie (2010) argues that Facebook users tend to be more concerned about privacy 
from their connections than from the company or affiliated businesses. Brandtzæg et al. (2010) find that 
Facebook users with more friends feel greater pressure to conform when posting information to the 
platform. In fact, Rhue and Sundararajan (2014) show that users of a social shopping website will even 
alter their buying habits to conform to the comments they receive about previous purchases. Social 
surveillance thus has the potential to augment user behavior. 
Social surveillance can also have implications for how users interact with each other online. Gross 
and Acquisti (2005) argue that online social networks breed a new kind of intimacy, in which users 
regularly share personal information widely and with many people. Lambert (2013) calls this new kind of 
intimacy “group intimacy,” and suggests that it is replacing traditional notions of intimacy – which are 
more interpersonal in nature. Geser (2008) goes as far as saying that intimacy is completely destroyed in 
online settings, because users are discouraged from revealing information privately and selectively to 
their various contacts. As Gerstein (1984) points out, it is precisely these private disclosures of 
information that separate intimate relationships from more casual ones.  
We follow Wilson et al. (2014) and take the view that users of online social networks carefully weigh 
concerns for privacy with those of impression management when disclosing information. Dinev and Hart 
(2006) call the weighing of costs and benefits in information exchange a “privacy calculus.”  We apply 
their insights to the context of gift giving, and show how social network theory helps us separate the costs 
to privacy from the benefits in impression management that result from digital gift exchange. We believe 
that gift exchange is a natural setting to study this tension because, as others have pointed out, gift giving 
itself can have both costs and benefits (Sherry et al. 1993, Wooten 2000) – as we discuss next. 
Moreover, because gift exchange is a relational act that takes place between people, studying it lets us 
focus on the effect of social surveillance on interpersonal intimacy in particular, rather than on behavior 
more generally. 
 
2.1 Gift Giving in Social Networks 
The decision to give a gift can put givers in an awkward place. On the one hand, giving a gift can 
make a giver look favorably in the eyes of the receiver. Mauss (1954) argues that gift exchange even puts 
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the giver in a position of power over the receiver until the gift is reciprocated. On the other hand, gift 
selection and delivery can also generate substantial anxiety for the giver (Sherry et al. 1993, Wooten 
2000). The source of anxiety can be around selecting the right gift, or breaking some norm around gift 
giving. For example, people may worry that by giving a gift to one person they are ignoring others that are 
equally deserving. People must thus weigh a variety of costs and benefits when deciding to participate in 
gift exchange. Since knowing more people provides more opportunities for the benefits of gift exchange to 
outweigh the costs, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: People with larger social networks will be more likely to participate in gift exchange 
 
The anxiety associated with gift giving may be exacerbated in settings where exchanges are visible 
to others. In such settings, more people may be present to witness a poor gifting decision, and there are 
more opportunities for comparisons of who did and did not receive a gift. The extent to which interactions 
between people are visible to others can be linked to structural properties of social networks. In particular, 
dense social networks – wherein people’s friends are friends with each other – limit the extent to which 
interactions are private (Boissevain 1974, Portes 1998). Thus, we expect that people who form 
connections to friends of friends will be less likely to participate in gift exchange, for fear that their 
exchanges will be visible to third parties that are not directly involved in the exchange.  
 
H2: People that have connected to friends of friends will be less likely to participate in gift exchange 
 
From an individual’s perspective, dense social networks can arise either because the individual 
connected to friends of friends, or because their friends connected to each other. We argue that only the 
former should affect gift exchange for two reasons. First, actively connecting to friends of friends makes 
the density of an individual’s network more salient, and should more directly influence their perceptions of 
privacy. In fact, a user may never find out that two of their friends connected to each other. Second, in our 
setting, and in online social networks more broadly, a friend of a friend connection is often prompted by 
an algorithm, and may not exist in the absence of the algorithm. These connections are thus likely to be 
weaker, on average, and their surveillance is likely to be more disconcerting. 
 
H3: Having friends connect to each other will not affect the likelihood of participating in gift exchange 
 
Next, we test these hypotheses in the context of an online social network that lets users buy and 
exchange electronic greeting cards with each other. 
3 Empirical Setting 
The company in our study launched its online social network in 2007. The network allowed users to 
maintain an online profile, connect with other users, and share messages, photos, videos, and other 
content with their connections. To stimulate connections on the network, the company displayed a list of 
recommended contacts in a widget on the main page of the site with the heading “People you may know” 
(see Figure 2). When a user clicked on one of these recommendations, she received a prompt that 
allowed her to request a connection from the recommended contact. If she chose to request the 
connection, the contact received an email notification alerting him of the connection request and allowing 
him to accept the request – which would form a connection between the two users. The widget then 
refreshed to replace the requested contact with a new recommendation. 
The company used an algorithm to generate a personalized list of recommendations for each user. 
This algorithm relied on two key pieces of data about users: 1) connections of their existing connections 
(i.e. friends of friends), and 2) people in their email address books. If a user had already formed 
connections, then the list of recommended contacts would largely consist of connections of those 
connections – ranked by the number of connections the user and the potential recommendation shared. 
However, the company also encouraged users to upload their email address books when signing up for 
the service. Users that uploaded their address books were prompted to send connection requests to their 
contacts during the sign-up process. Sometimes, these contacts would also appear in the 
recommendation widget. 
A unique feature of this online social network is that users could send electronic greeting cards 
(eCards) to each other over the network. While a small sample of these eCards were provided free of 
charge, the company also offered users the option of buying an annual subscription to premium eCards 
for $12.95. The company even had an artist on staff who was responsible for designing these eCards. 
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Links to the company’s eCard collection were found on various places on the site, and users who wished 
to send an eCard to one of their connections could simply click on any one of these links. After selecting 
an eCard,  
 
Figure 2. The online social network with “People you may know” widget 
users had the option of adding a personal message to the card before sending it off. Once sent, the 
eCard was displayed on the receiver’s profile page. 
Figure 3 shows an eCard exchange between two users of the online social network. In general, 
users could choose to make eCards private, which meant that only the sender and receiver were able to 
see them. However, eCards where public by default, and few users opted to make them private. In 
addition to being displayed on the receiver’s profile page, eCards were also visible in the content streams 
of users who had connections to both the sender and receiver. Thus, users that were not directly involved 
in an exchange could see and even comment on the eCard. Next, we model the diffusion of the premium 
eCard service to relate eCard purchase to properties of users’ social networks.   
3.1 Modeling the Diffusion of eCards 
To examine how properties of users’ networks influenced their decisions to pay for premium eCards, 
we construct a discrete hazard model using a complementary log-log link function (Prentice and Gloeckler 
1978, Bell and Song 2007, Katona et al. 2011). There are a number of advantages to using this model. 
First, estimates from it are also estimates from a continuous time proportional hazards model (Prentice 
and Gloeckler 1978). Second, the model is ideal for including time-varying covariates (Bell and Song 
2007), which allows us to include several network measures that varied across time. Finally, Katona et al. 
(2011) also use this model to study the effects of network characteristics on diffusion, lending further 
support for its application in our setting. 
We model the probability that user i buys a premium eCard subscription in period t, given that they 
have purchased a subscription at an earlier point in time, as  
 Prob P! = t|P! ≥ t = 1 − exp − exp α + βX! t  
 P! denotes the period that user i first purchases a premium eCard subscription. The right-hand side of the 
equation is the complementary log-log link function of the covariate vector X! t . This vector contained 
time-varying network measures as well as several control variables. Next, we discuss these network 
measures and controls in more detail. 
3.2 Network Measures and Controls 
Our first measure is the size of users’ networks, which is simply the number of connections they had 
formed. The second and third measures capture the density of users’ networks from connecting to friends 
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Figure 3. An eCard with third party comments 
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the clustering coefficient, which is the number of connections between one’s contacts divided by the 
number of possible connections between them (Watts and Strogatz 1998). Like Jiang and Chen (2014), 
we use the timing of connection to break down the clustering coefficient into two separate measures. 
When users connected to friends of friends, then the last connection formed in the triad will be to one of 
their friends. On the other hand, when users’ friends connected to each other, the last connection formed 
will be the connection between their friends (see Figure 4). 
To estimate the effects of these measures on eCard purchase, we fix the network of connections at 
twelve points in time – every two months between November 1, 2007 and September 1, 2009. We use 
the measures on those days to predict eCard purchases in the following two months. In each period, we 
only consider the decisions of users that had at least two connections. This requirement ensures that our 
density measures are well-defined. We also only study the decisions of the 53,823 users that eventually 
purchased a premium eCard subscription, for two reasons. First, by restricting our analysis to those who 
eventually purchased, we study users for whom a subscription was actually a consideration. Second, 
there were nearly 7 million users of the network in total. It would be computationally taxing to calculate 
network measures and estimate our models for all of these users in all twelve periods. 
We should note that, while we only study the purchase decisions of users who eventually purchased 
a premium eCard subscription, we include all of these users’ connections when calculating the network 
measures. Table 1 shows summary statistics of the network measures by date. The average number of 
connections per user increased over time. Interestingly, both density measures also generally increased 
over time. This may seem somewhat surprising, since density might be expected to decrease as 
networks get larger. However, in our setting, one of the main drivers of connectivity was an algorithm that 
encouraged users to connect to friends of friends. We interpret the joint increases in network size and 
density as additional evidence for the algorithm. 
In addition to our network measures, we also include several control variables when estimating our 
models. Table 2 provides a summary of these variables. We include an indicator for the user’s gender, 
how many contacts they had in their email address book, and how many of those contacts were also 
users of the network. We also include indicators for each of the time periods in our study, which we 
interpret as baseline hazards in the absence of other covariates (Bell and Song 2007). We also include 
indicators for the period that users joined the network to account for differences between early and late 
adopters. Finally, we include indicators for the 175 countries that are represented in our dataset. Table 3 
shows the most popular countries in our dataset, along with the number of users originating from each of 
these countries. Next, we discuss the results of estimating our model. 
4 Results 
We estimate five specifications of the complementary log-log model, which vary in the set of network 
measures we include. Table 4 displays parameter estimates from these different specifications. Across all 
of these models, females are more likely to buy a premium eCard subscription than males. When network 
measures are not included in Model 1, there is a significant negative effect of address book size but a 
positive effect of address book contacts who are themselves users of the social network. We find 
consistent support for the positive effect of social network connections across Models 2-4, lending 
support for our first hypothesis. When number of connections is included in the model, the effect of 
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Figure 4. Distinguishing connections to friends of friends from friends connecting 
 
 




Friend of a Friend 
Density: 
Friends Connecting 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
1. Nov 1, 2007 2,742 9.7 19.1 .07 .22 .07 .21 
2. Jan 1, 2008 13,652 13.9 31.4 .06 .16 .05 .15 
3. Mar 1, 2008 20,415 15.8 33.7 .06 .16 .05 .14 
4. May 1, 2008 25,845 16.9 34.8 .06 .16 .05 .14 
5. July 1, 2008 32,211 18.2 35.4 .07 .17 .06 .15 
6. Sep 1, 2008 40,257 23.2 42.0 .08 .17 .07 .15 
7. Nov 1, 2008 45,153 27.4 50.0 .09 .17 .07 .14 
8. Jan 1, 2009 48,141 30.6 58.2 .10 .17 .07 .13 
9. Mar 1, 2009 50,434 33.4 65.0 .10 .17 .07 .13 
10. May 1, 2009 52,199 35.5 69.1 .10 .16 .07 .12 
11. July 1, 2009 53,186 36.8 71.8 .10 .16 .07 .12 
12. Sep 1, 2009 53,823 38.0 74.4 .10 .16 .07 .12 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Key Variables by Date 
 
Variable Description 
Gender Indicator Indicator equal to 1 for females users 
Email Contacts Number of contacts in user’s email address book 
Email Users Number of other users in user’s email address book 
Period Indicators Indicators for period of study 
Joined Indicators Indicators for period user joined the network 
Country Indicators Indicators for country of origin 
Table 2. Descriptions of Control Variables 
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Country Number of Users Country Number of Users 
United States 39,725 Denmark 638 
United Kingdom 1,961 Brazil 573 
Canada 1,300 South Africa 519 
Netherlands 1,273 Norway 423 
Australia 870 Germany 421 
Belgium 680 France 414 
Table 3. Most Popular Countries in the Dataset 
 
In Model 3, we find a significant negative effect of density due to connecting to friends of friends, 
which supports our second hypothesis. Moreover, both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the 
Bayesian Information Criterion point to this as the best model. In Model 4, we include the density due to 
users’ friends connecting, which does not have a significant effect as our final hypothesis predicts. When 
all three network measures are included in Model 5, the direction and significance of their effects do not 
change. In the next section, we discuss a model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity by adding 
user-level random effects to our regression.   
4.1 Models with Frailty 
To control for unobserved heterogeneity, we model the probability that user i buys a premium eCard 
subscription in period t, given that she has not purchased one at an earlier point in time, as 
 Prob P! = t|P! ≥ t = 1 − exp − exp α + βX! t + u!  
 
where we assume that u! ~ N(0,σ2). These random effects vary by individual, and are sometime referred 
to as “frailty” in the context of hazard models (Jenkins 1995). We estimated our models from the previous 
section with the added frailty term, and we find similar results as before. Connections have a positive 
effect, while the effect of density from connecting to friends of friends is negative. We still find no support 
for an effect of density due to users’ friends connecting to each other. While we do not report the 
estimates of this alternative specification here, they are available from the authors upon request. 
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Period Indicators  Included Included Included Included Included 
Joined Indicators  Included Included Included Included Included 





 Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations  
 
155,329 155,329 155,329 155,329 155,329 
χ2  8604.82 8727.06 8741.56 8727.16 8741.70 
AIC  
 
161,087 160,967 160,954 160,968 160,956 
BIC  162,858 162,748 162,746 162,760 162,757 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Table 4. Complementary Log-Log Models 
5 Conclusion 
In this study, we demonstrate that social visibility deters users from sending digital greeting cards to 
each other over an online social network. Moreover, we argue that the algorithms which social media 
companies readily use to encourage connectivity can make users’ interactions more visible to third parties 
– often to people with whom users would not necessarily connect in the absence of an algorithm. We use 
the timing of connections to separate the effects of density from users connecting to friends of friends and 
density from users’ friends connecting to each other, and only find evidence for the former. These findings 
have implications for the success of digital gifting services, and for how algorithms shape our online 
interactions more broadly. 
Facebook, the most popular online social network, has twice tried and failed to launch a service that 
lets its users send digital gifts to each other.2 Our findings suggest that Facebook’s People You May 
Know (PYMK) algorithm could have contributed to these failures. However, we also find that increasing 
the size of users’ networks increases their propensity to buy gifts. Thus, it is not encouraging connectivity 
in general that can be harmful, but encouraging connections to friends of friends in particular. One 
implication of our findings is that companies need to be more strategic about the types of connections 
they recommend. Another implication is that companies should be wary of showing interactions between 
users to third parties. Facebook may already know this, as its News Feed algorithm now regularly hides 
interactions between users’ friends (Eslami et al. 2015). 
Our study has a number of limitations that are worth discussing. First, we constrain our analysis to 
users who eventually purchased a premium eCard subscription. Our results are thus best interpreted as 
reflecting the timing of purchase rather than the decision to purchase. For example, we find that users 
with more connections purchased an eCard subscription earlier than those with fewer connections, and 
that users that connected to friends of friends purchased an eCard subscription later than those who did 
not. An equally interesting question is what distinguishes users that chose to buy a subscription from 
those that did not, and we leave this question for future research. Second, we do not have data about the 
actual exchange of eCards, but only about purchases of an eCard subscription. Thus, what we measure 
is the intention to send gifts. An important consideration is the extent to which intentions to give gifts 
translate into actual gift exchange. This, too, we leave for future research. 
Algorithms will continue to shape our lives for the foreseeable future. At times, they will enrich them, 
like by pointing us to books and movies that we love and would never know about otherwise. At other 
times, they will frustrate and even offend us, like by telling us that our names are not real names.3 In 
either case, as researchers we have an obligation to reveal the effects that these hidden processes have 
on people’s lives (Pasquale 2015). For some good (and possibly some bad) reasons, companies will 
likely continue to err on the side of keeping their algorithms secret. However, our study makes the case 
that there can be unintended consequences of algorithms that are unknown even to the very companies 
that design them. Moreover, these unintended consequences can hurt these companies, as we suggest 
was the case with Facebook’s failed gifting services. Companies could benefit from providing greater 
                                                       
2 See http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/29/an-obituary-for-facebook-gifts/, viewed January 31, 2016 
3 In 2015, Facebook suspended Native Americans, drag queens, and domestic abuse survivors from their accounts for not providing 
their “real name.” See http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/19/native-american-activist-facebook-lawsuit-real-name, 
viewed January 31, 2016 
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transparency into these processes, especially to the academic community. In any case, society would 
surely benefit. 
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